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This Article explores the concept of “easy legislation,” tracing the drafting of a bill with strong 
bipartisan support coupled with an executive imperative from its roots in an information uprising 
and unenacted bill language through its enactment into law.  This Article argues that once a topic 
is grounded in bipartisan support and an executive imperative, an individual legislator has little 
choice but to compromise.  Such compromise results in two key legislative moments:  a) the hot 













Statement of Originality 
 
 This Article examines a previously unconsidered category of legislation:  “easy 
legislation.”  I define “easy” legislation as legislation with strong bipartisan support1 coupled2 
with an executive imperative.3  Prior legislative scholarship has consistently focused on 
legislative histories situated in eras of domestic conflict and has been oriented to identify the 
winners and losers in Congress.4  In contrast, this Article argues that, since Congress in fact often 
legislates on topics which at their core simply are not divisive, such bills warrant serious 
academic consideration.  This Article makes a significant contribution, as no previous 
scholarship has pursued a rigorous study of the “easy legislation” process. 
Since this Article is the first to explore the process by which an easy legislative topic 
becomes law, this Article is the first to identify two key events in the process of “easy 
legislation”—moments when partisan politics flame up but dissolve into compromise:  (a) the 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this Article, I shall define “bipartisan” as denoting “the existence of a high degree of consensus 
or unity among decision makers on the content of external policy,” including decision makers in both the 
Republican and Democratic parties.  CECIL V. CRABB, JR., GLENN J. ANTIZZO, & GEILA E. SARIEDDINE, CONGRESS 
AND THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS:  MODES OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR 82 (2000) (“The desired objective in the 
foreign policy process is often described by the term bipartisanship.  Yet it must be acknowledged at the outset that 
the concept of bipartisanship is by no means easy to define satisfactorily.  The term has a number of significant 
connotations.  Unquestionably, the principle of bipartisanship is also sometimes invoked or relied upon by officials 
in Washington to achieve their own parochial or political ends.”) 
2 Since “a wide gap separates what presidents want from what they can get,” and “Congress can influence what, 
when, how or even whether executive recommendations are sent to Capitol Hill,” the coupling of an executive 
imperative with bipartisan support is required for easy lawmaking.  ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, 
CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 291 (7th ed. 2000). 
3 Wayne P. Steger, Presidential Policy Initiation and the Politics of Agenda Control, 24 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 17 
(1997) (arguing that “presidents are more successful on legislation initiated by their administrations because agenda 
setting and policy initiation are sources of influence in the legislative process and because the administration can 
accommodate legislative preferences when it initiates legislation”). 
4 See Charles Whalen & Barbara Whalen, THE LONGEST DEBATE:  A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT (1985); Nina M. Moore, GOVERNING RACE: POLICY, PROCESS, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 64-65 
(2000) (arguing that debates of civil rights legislation spurred "the fiercest active opposition ever pitted against a set 
of legislative proposals"); Francis Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966); 
Roger Clegg, A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994); and Robert D. 
Loevy, TO END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 7 (1990) 
("In the Senate, and by far the largest obstacle of all, was the filibuster.")   
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hot topic sacrifice5 and (b) the ideological amendment inundation.6  Additionally, this Article 
presents a fresh look at compromise in the political process.   
Building upon the scholarship of William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, I 
structure my examination of “easy lawmaking” through the lens of a particular legislative 
history.7  Where Eskridge and Frickey examined the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which was enacted 
in a fraught social context among contentious debate, in this Article I examine the U.S. 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. 8   When President Bush 
announced in his February 3, 2003 State of the Union address that he would support funding 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, he provided an executive imperative that propelled 
Congress toward legislation.  However, his announcement was not the first indication that 
Congress would support for HIV/AIDS research.  Rather, the president’s executive imperative 
responded to several years of congressional hearings and proposed legislation.9  Thus, U.S. 
Leadership presents an excellent vehicle for research into the process of easy legislation.   
                                                 
5 I will use the term “hot topic sacrifice” to refer to a decision by the executive and majority party to forgo using 
“easy legislation” as an opportunity to pursue a tangentially-related and highly contentious issue.   
6 I will use the term “ideological amendment inundation” to refer to insertion of majority party ideology into the bill 
through floor amendments.   
7 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:  
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 21.  For 
8 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601-7682 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. Leadership].  U.S. Leadership is even “easier” legislation, since 
President Bush was, at the time, a “majority President”—i.e., the Presidency and Congress were controlled by the 
same political party.  See, e.g. Sarah A. Binder, The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary 
Rights in the House, 1789- 1990, AM. POL. SCI. REV. 8, 10 (1996) (arguing that “minority rights to offer 
amendments are routinely limited by the majority party and many committees are disproportionately stacked in the 
majority party’s favor”).  But see HOW CONGRESS WORKS 5 (3rd ed. 1998) (arguing that “control of Congress and 
the presidency by the same party does not always guarantee cooperation between the two branches.  There have 
been numerous occasions in American history in which determined lawmakers resisted the proposals of their own 
presidents, and strong-willed presidents disregarded their party leaders in Congress.”).   
9 See, e.g., A bill to provide assistance to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic in developing foreign countries, S. 2649, 
107th Cong. (2002); A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to increase assistance for foreign countries 
seriously affect by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and for other purposes, S. 2525 107th Cong. (2002); To 
amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize assistance to prevent, treat, and monitor HIV/AIDS in sub-
Saharan African and other developing countries, H.R. 2069, 107th Cong. (2001); To amend the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 to provide assistance for the prevention, treatment, and control of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, 
polio, and other infectious diseases as such diseases affect children in the countries of Central Asia, H.R. 5681, 
107th Cong. (2002). To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize the provision of education and 
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Conclusion 
 This Article makes a unique contribution to the existing literature on legislation by 
examining the legislative process at its least contentious.  Through study of the legislative history 
of U.S. Leadership, this Article highlights the mechanisms through which the executive and the 
majority party compromise in order to propel legislation through both Houses.  Thus, this Article 
contributes to legislation scholarship a previously unconsidered area of legislation:  legislative 








                                                                                                                                                             
related services to law enforcement and military personnel of foreign countries to prevent and control HIV/AIDS 
and tuberculosis, H.R. 2104, 107th Cong. (2001); To improve global health by increasing assistance to developing 
nations with high levels of infectious disease and premature death, by improving children’s and women’s health and 
nutrition, by reducing unintended pregnancies, and by combating the spread of infectious diseases, particularly 
HIV/AIDS, and for other purposes, H.R. 1269, 107th Cong. (2001); To amend the Public Health Service Act to 
focus American efforts on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in developing countries, S. 1230, 107th Cong. 
(2001); To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to increase the authorization of appropriations for fiscal year 
2002, and to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003, to combat HIV and AIDS, and for other purposes, S. 
1120, 107th Cong. (2001).  Accord Jennifer G. Cooke &. Stephen Morrison, Building an Ethic of Public Policy 
Discourse:  An Appeal to the African Studies Community, 30 AFR. ISSUES 63, 63 (2002) (“[T]he recent initiatives 
have been propelled by high-level awareness that expanded commitments in Africa can attract bipartisan support at 
home and, indeed, that they make for good domestic politics.”)   
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THE PATH OF “EASY LEGISLATION”:   
A CASE STUDY OF THE U.S. LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS 
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003 
 
[T]his entire bill is a moral crusade.  Not to impose our values on anyone, but to save a continent 
of the Great Plague of our age.”10 
      -- Rep. DeLay (R-TX) 
 
“In this post-Sept. 11 world, it is all too easy to lose sight of the global HIV/AIDS crisis . . . if 
we have learned anything through our terrible national tragedy, it is that the world’s problems are 
our problems.” 11 
       -- Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Previous scholars working on legislative histories have often focused on tumultuous 
legislation—the 1964 Civil Rights Act,12 Title VII,13 or the Civil Rights Act of 1991.14  Their 
scholarship tells a story of “the NAACP and other organizations . . .  pressing in courts and in 
legislative halls and lobbies for protection of minority rights,”15 of “[d]emonstrations —and the 
tensions and counter violence that often accompanied them,”16 of a “heightened sense of 
urgency.”17  These legislative histories teach the struggle of filibusters18 and the seeming miracle 
                                                 
10 149 CONG. REC. H 3579, 3615 (2003) (statement of Rep. DeLay) 
11 Miles A. Pomper, House Votes to Increase Efforts to Fight AIDS Worldwide, CQ WKLY., Dec. 15, 2001. 
12 See Charles Whalen & Barbara Whalen, THE LONGEST DEBATE:  A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT (1985).  See, e.g., Nina M. Moore, GOVERNING RACE: POLICY, PROCESS, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 
64-65 (2000) (arguing that debates of civil rights legislation spurred "the fiercest active opposition ever pitted 
against a set of legislative proposals") 
13 See Francis Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966).  Cf. Note, Employment 
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113-19 (1971) (discussing the 
legislative purpose of Title VII). 
14 See Roger Clegg, A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994).  Cf. 
Cheryl M. Miller & Hanes Walton, Jr., Congressional Support of Civil Rights Public Policy: From Bipartisan to 
Partisan Convergence, 21 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 11 (1994) (analyzing the partisan/bipartisan shifts in support for 
civil rights legislation). 
15 See Vaas, supra note 5. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See Whalen, supra note 4 at 148 ("[Supporters] would face a fierce filibuster . . . that could be stopped only by 
cloture. And cloture . . . had never been successful on a civil rights bill."); Robert D. Loevy, TO END ALL 
SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 7(1990) ("In the Senate, and by 
far the largest obstacle of all, was the filibuster.")   
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of cloture.19  They are dramatized with a decided flourish:  “Senator Engle cast his vote from his 
wheelchair by feebly lifting his left hand toward his eye . . . Hubert Humprey raised his arms 
over his head in jubilation.”20  Even a scholarly legislative history of the American Inventor's 
Protection Act ("AIPA")—a patent law—tells of congressional tension:  “After four years of 
scathing debate, the final hours of the 1999 legislative session gave birth to a $ 390 billion 
omnibus spending bill that implemented the biggest changes to patent law since 1952. The bill 
was subsequently signed into law . . . amid a flurry of denunciations and reprisals by the bill's 
opponents.”21  These legislative histories are situated in eras of domestic conflict and are 
consistently oriented to identify the winners and losers in Congress.22   
While such stories do illuminate congressional procedures and illustrate coalition 
building, they do not tell the only story of lawmaking.  The 1964 Civil Rights Act may well be 
“an excellent vehicle for the consideration of our analysis of statute making, legislative rhetoric, 
and the relevance of our views to the current normative debate over statutory interpretation.”23  
Yet, the nation is not always up in arms.  Congressmen are not always bitterly divided on 
whether a topic should even be the subject of legislation.  How, then, is the legislative scholar to 
approach a bill with deep bipartisan support and a moral imperative recognized across the 
                                                 
19 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:  
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 21.   
20 Id.   
21 Edward R. Ergenzinger Jr., The American Inventor's Protection Act: A Legislative History, 7 WAKE FOREST 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 142, 143 (2006).  But see Vincent P. Tassinari, Compiled Legislative History of 35 U.S.C. § 284; 
The Patent Compensation Statute, 31 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 45 (2000) (composing a straight-forward legislative 
history without theatrical flourish).   
22 Ergenzinger, supra note 12, at 165. 
23 Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives 
on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1423 (2003).   
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country? 24  What if that bill does not even address an exclusively—or even expressly—
American topic?  What can one learn from bills that, topically and at their core, are not divisive?   
This Article will explore the process of “easy lawmaking.”25  I define “easy” legislation 
as legislation with strong bipartisan support26 coupled27 with an executive imperative.28  
Particularly “easy” legislation is a means to further both moral29 and national security ends30—
                                                 
24 See David Epstein, Legislating from Both Sides of the Aisle: Information and the Value of Bipartisan Consensus, 
101 PUB. CHOICE 1, 2 (1999) (“When actors from both ends of the political spectrum support a policy, then the 
uncertainty surrounding outcomes is reduced, to the benefit of all legislators.”).  See also ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC 
LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 364 (2nd ed. 2002) (characterizing bipartisan legislation as “somewhat atypical”). 
25 “Easy legislation” is not synonymous with “noncontroversial bills or bills of minor interest,” which often qualify 
for “unanimous consent and suspension of the rules,” which are House “time-saving procedures.”  HOW CONGRESS 
WORKS 72 (3rd ed. 1998).   
26 For the purposes of this Article, I shall define “bipartisan” as denoting “the existence of a high degree of 
consensus or unity among decision makers on the content of external policy,” including decision makers in both the 
Republican and Democratic parties.  CECIL V. CRABB, JR., GLENN J. ANTIZZO, & GEILA E. SARIEDDINE, CONGRESS 
AND THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS:  MODES OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR 82 (2000) (“The desired objective in the 
foreign policy process is often described by the term bipartisanship.  Yet it must be acknowledged at the outset that 
the concept of bipartisanship is by no means easy to define satisfactorily.  The term has a number of significant 
connotations.  Unquestionably, the principle of bipartisanship is also sometimes invoked or relied upon by officials 
in Washington to achieve their own parochial or political ends.”).   For a discussion of the circumstances under 
which the benefits of bipartisanship outweigh its costs, see Epstein, supra note 15, at 2 (“First, I show that in all 
instances bipartisan support for legislation is treated as more informative than partisan support. Second, 
bipartisanship will be used more when the uncertainty surrounding policy outcomes is greatest and when partisan 
policy differences are small. Third, my model predicts the possibility of “minority party gatekeeping”: by 
withholding their support from legislation, minority party members can induce the majority party to hold up bills in 
committee. Finally, my results point to a paradox of partisanship. Legislators viewed as partisan are usually assumed 
unwilling to accommodate minority party demands. But in an incomplete information setting, it is exactly those 
legislators with extreme preferences who most need minority party support to pass legislation. In other words, the 
more partisan a legislator, the more she values bipartisanship.”). 
27 Since “a wide gap separates what presidents want from what they can get,” and “Congress can influence what, 
when, how or even whether executive recommendations are sent to Capitol Hill,” the coupling of an executive 
imperative with bipartisan support is required for “easy legislation.”  ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, 
CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 291 (7th ed. 2000). 
28 Wayne P. Steger, Presidential Policy Initiation and the Politics of Agenda Control, 24 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 17 
(1997) (arguing that “presidents are more successful on legislation initiated by their administrations because agenda 
setting and policy initiation are sources of influence in the legislative process and because the administration can 
accommodate legislative preferences when it initiates legislation”). 
29 See Barbara Cole Nienstedt, The Use of Mandatory Sentencing Legislation as Symbolic Statements, 6 POL’Y 
STUD. REV. 36, 36 (1986) (“Laws are passed for many reasons.  Not the least among these are laws which are passed 
to legitimize and accentuate moral indignation.”). 
30 See 148 CONG. REC. S5774, 5780 (2002) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“The disease had wiped out the parents the 
most productive segment of the population teachers, military personnel, hospital workers, and law enforcement 
officers.  African orphans therefore lack teachers, role models and leaders.  This leaves them vulnerable to criminal 
organizations, revolutionary militias, and terrorists.  Terrorism and crime could become a way of life for a young 
generation.”). But see  David P. Fidler, Public Health and National Security in the Global Age: Infectious Diseases, 
Bioterrorism, and Realpolitik, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 787, 843 n.238 (2003) (arguing that from a “realpolitik” 
perspective the HIV/AIDS crisis does not present a national security crisis for the United States). 
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ends recognized and backed by both sides of the aisle.31  An even “easier” piece of legislation 
responds to an issue where any individual Congressman’s choice not to legislate could spin her 
into a public relations nightmare.   
This Article will use the “U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
Act of 2003” (U.S. Leadership),32  Public Law 108-25, for a case study of such “easy 
legislation.”  This Article will not address in any detail post-enactment political reactions or legal 
challenges to the law.33  Nor will this Article focus on post-enactment appropriations concerns or 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Senators Boxer (D-CA) and Smith’s (R-OR) bill from the 107th Congress, which outlines its 
purposes:  “(1) help prevent human suffering through prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of HIV/AIDS; and (2) 
help ensure the viability of economic development, stability, and national security in the developing world by 
advancing research to—(A) understand the cuases associated with HIV/AIDS in developing countries; and (B) assist 
in the development of an AIDS vaccine.”  To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to increase authorization of 
appropriations for fiscal year 2002, and to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003, to combat HIV and AIDS, 
and for other purposes, S. 1120, 107th Cong. (2001). 
32 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601-7682 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. Leadership].  U.S. Leadership is even “easier” legislation, since 
President Bush was, at the time, a “majority President”—i.e., the Presidency and Congress were controlled by the 
same political party.  See, e.g. Sarah A. Binder, The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary 
Rights in the House, 1789- 1990, AM. POL. SCI. REV. 8, 10 (1996) (arguing that “minority rights to offer 
amendments are routinely limited by the majority party and many committees are disproportionately stacked in the 
majority party’s favor”).  But see HOW CONGRESS WORKS 5 (3rd ed. 1998) (arguing that “control of Congress and 
the presidency by the same party does not always guarantee cooperation between the two branches.  There have 
been numerous occasions in American history in which determined lawmakers resisted the proposals of their own 
presidents, and strong-willed presidentes disregarded their party leaders in Congress.”).  See generally Larry 
Nowels, CONG. RES. SERV., AIDS IN AFRICA (2003) (providing legislative details and policy analysis of the new 
global AIDS law).  Cf. Jennifer G. Cooke &. Stephen Morrison, Building an Ethic of Public Policy Discourse:  An 
Appeal to the African Studies Community, 30 AFR. ISSUES 63, 63 (2002) (“Americans favor engagement in good 
faith with Africa, and in this era the U.S. relationship with Africa has grown more, not less, complex and enduring.”) 
33 See David P. Fidler, Fighting the Axis of Illness: HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 17 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 99, 100 (2004) (“discontent with the Bush Administration's handling of HIV/AIDS continues and 
flows from a variety of concerns, including the perceived inadequacy of U.S. financial contributions, the speed with 
which U.S. contributions will reach affected countries, the manner in which the United States has increased its 
commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, the conditions imposed by the United States for use of its financial contributions, 
and the underlying policy rationales for heightened U.S. concern with HIV/AIDS”) (citations omitted).  For a 
discussion of political and legal reactions to the anti-prostitution “pledge” provision, see Lauren E. Baer, Recent 
Development, Making Enemies from Allies:  How the Global AIDS Act Undermines Partnerships to Combat AIDS 
and Sex Trafficking, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 513 (2006); Rachael Moshman, Litigation Updates: The Anti-Prostitution 
Pledge: Limiting Speech and Development, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 66 (2005).  See also Janie Chuang, The 
United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
437, 491 (2006) (“While some of these consequences are perhaps beyond the control of the U.S. government, it is 
entirely predictable that certain U.S. government actions would chill NGO participation in the interactive process. 
The requirement that NGOs take an "anti-prostitution pledge" or else be disqualified from U.S. financial assistance 
will continue to alienate service providers whose contribution to anti-trafficking norm development is vital.”) 
(citations omitted); Edi C. M. Kinney, Recent Development, Appropriations for the Abolitionists: Undermining 
Effects of U.S. Mandatory Anti-Prostitution Pledge in the Fight Against Human Trafficking and HIV/AIDS, 21 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 158, 169 (2006).   
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functional difficulties.34  Rather, this Article will discuss the process by which this bill emerged 
from a pool of legislative options and became law.   
I will argue from the experience of U.S. Leadership’s enactment that once the 
foundational topic up for legislation receives resounding bipartisan support and an executive 
mandate, there is suddenly little an individual legislator can do but compromise.  “Easy 
legislation” is an unwilling vehicle for partisan politics.   
In Part I, I will examine the pre-enactment milieu.  I will consider the information 
uprising that rendered the African and Caribbean HIV/AIDS crisis an “easy legislation” topic.  
Additionally, in order to best understand the process of enacting U.S. Leadership, I will consider 
its legislative predecessors, tracing the development of U.S. Leadership’s constituent parts.  In 
Part II, I will analyze the critical choices in the legislative history of U.S. Leadership.  I will 
provide an evaluation of that history contrasting the bill’s compromise march with its staccato 
ideological insertions.  Most importantly, I will explore the two principal moments when partisan 
politics flamed up but to a large extent dissolved into compromise:  (a) the hot topic sacrifice35 
and (b) the ideological amendment inundation.36     
 
                                                                                                                                                             
  For critical discussion of PEPFAR’s position on pharmaceutical pricing, see Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical 
Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y 
L. & ETHICS 193, 273 (2005) (“PEPFAR appears to operate in the mode of many bilateral aid projects, as a subsidy 
for domestic exports.”)  See also International Women’s Health Coalition, Global HIV/AIDS:  Ideology over 
Prevention:  The Global HIV/AIDS Pandemic and the Bush Administration, 
http://www.iwhc.org/global/uspolicy/hivaids (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) (criticizing the Pitts Amendment, Smith 
Amendment, and “Litmus Test”). 
34 For a discussion of hurdles in the PEPFAR appropriations process, see Asia Russell, Case Study, The Bush 
Administration’s Global AIDS Promises—and Praxis, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 133 (2004).  See also 
Donald G. McNeil Jr., Bush’s AIDS Effort Limited By Restrictions, NY TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007 (discussing 
legislative restriction deemed “hindering” by the Institute of Medicine”).  Cf. Caroline Scorneck, House Panel 
Expresses Regret Over Lack of Funding to Fight HIV/AIDS Overseas, CQ WKLY, July 12, 2003, at 1766. 
35 I will use the term “hot topic sacrifice” to refer to a decision by the executive and majority party to forgo using 
“easy legislation” as an opportunity to pursue a tangentially-related and highly contentious issue.   
36 I will use the term “ideological amendment inundation” to refer to insertion of majority party ideology into the bill 
through floor amendments.   
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I. THE “EASY LEGISLATION” CONGRESSIONAL CULTURE 
 
 U.S. Leadership authorized $15 billion to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa and the 
Caribbean.37  This legislation crystallized after President Bush’s State of the Union address on 
February 3, 2003, when the President asked “Congress to commit $15 billion over the next 5 
years, including nearly $10 billion in new money, to turn the tide against AIDS in the most 
afflicted nations of Africa and the Caribbean.”38  President Bush announced that “to meet a 
severe and urgent crisis abroad” he proposed “the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a work of 
mercy beyond all current international efforts to help the people of Africa.”39  The President’s 
plan would “prevent 7 million new AIDS infections, treat at least 2 million people with life-
extending drugs, and provide humane care for millions of people suffering from AIDS and for 
children orphaned by AIDS.”40 As now enacted and effectuated, the President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) works with a three-prong focus—prevention, treatment, and care—
and is administered through the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, a new section within the U.S. 
State Department.41  President Bush’s State of the Union announcement provided Congress with 
an executive imperative that propelled HIV/AIDS legislation onto the Union Calendar.42  
                                                 
37 United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C.A. 7601 (2003).   
38 President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, Feb. 3, 
2003. 
39 Id.  The Union Calendar is a “Calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, to which 
shall be referred public bills and public resolutions raising revenue, involving a tax or charge on the people, directly 
or indirectly making appropriations of money or property or requiring such appropriations to be made, authorizing 
payments out of appropriations already made, releasing any liability to the United States for money or property, or 
referring a claim to the Court of Claims. general appropriations bills, and bills of a public character directly or 
indirectly appropriating money or property.”  Parliamentary Outreach Program, Calendars of the House, 
http://www.rules.house.gov/Archives/house_cals.htm.  
40 Id. 
41 “Latest Results,” http://www.pepfar.gov/about/c19785.htm. 
42 Cf. Steger, supra note 19 (“Congress influences the administration's legislative requests, through consultations and 
the anticipation of congressional reactions, even before those requests are submitted. When executive branch 
officials anticipate congressional reactions to their proposals and structure their proposals so as to minimize 
changes, then congressional attitudes have affected the product since they affected the ways in which the proposals 
were developed and framed.”) 
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However, his address was not the original catalyst for international HIV/AIDS 
legislation.  Rather, his executive imperative responded to several years of congressional 
hearings and proposed legislation.43  When the President announced his Emergency Plan, the 
greatest surprise was the funding level—not the federal government’s interest in passing 
HIV/AIDS legislation.  For example, under the Clinton Administration, Congress passed the 
Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000.44  President Bush’s executive imperative 
responded to several years of congressional hearings and numerous bills seeking to increase 
international assistance to combat the HIV/AIDS crisis.  Examination of those hearings and bills 
illuminates the depth of information and legislative choice that would facilitate the 108th 
Congress’s “easy legislation.” 
A. Hearings 
 
Congressional hearings building toward U.S. Leadership began on June 7, 2001 in the 
House Committee on International Relations.   These hearings continued throughout the next two 
years, as both the House and Senate heard testimony on the HIV/AIDS crisis.  The first hearing 
in the House was designed to “examine the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa and to review the U.S. 
role in AIDS prevention and control in Africa.”45  The Committee on International Relations 
heard testimony from a range of government officers and NGOs, including the Administrator of 
the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Senegal Ambassador to the U.S., the 
President of the Corporate Council on Africa, the Executive Director of the Foundation for 
International Community Assistance, and the Co-Director of the Global AIDS Alliance.46  This 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., Cooke &. Morrison, supra note 23, at 63 (“[T]he recent initiatives have been propelled by high-level 
awareness that expanded commitments in Africa can attract bipartisan support at home and, indeed, that they make 
for good domestic politics.”)   
44 22 U.S.C. 6801 et seq.   
45 AIDS Epidemic in Africa, Review & Response: Hearing Before the Comm. On Int’l Rel., 107th Cong. (2001).   
46 Id. 
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discussion highlighted the microenterprise development programs, which would provide loans to 
the poor in developing countries so that they could establish small businesses for self-
employment.  This early debate about microenterprise development programs sparked a funding 
debate that would continue for almost three years and emerge in the debate over U.S. Leadership.   
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a complementary hearing in February 
of 2002.  Three-quarters of a year later, the focus of the debate had shifted toward reviewing 
U.S. efforts to combat HIV/AIDS alongside international efforts in HIV/AIDS prevention and 
control.  The Senate also heard from a broad range of government officers and NGOs.  The 
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development testified again.  This time he 
was accompanied by the Secretary of HHS and the Under Secretary for Global Affairs in the 
Department of State.  The Executive Director of the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS 
addressed the UN HIV/AIDS prevention measures.  The Senate Committee also heard from the 
directors of various African medical programs and global health initiatives, as well as from the 
Director of the Center for International Development at Harvard University and the Director of 
the Infectious Disease and Social Change at Harvard Medical School.  This Senate attention to 
the academic perspective on the HIV/AIDS crisis reflects in several bill drafts from the 107th 
Congress.   
In April of 2002, the House Committee on International Relations again addressed the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic—this time with a focus on efforts to assist children “orphaned or otherwise 
adversely affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa.  The International Relations Committee 
heard from yet another panel of NGOs:  Nyumbani Orphanage in Kenya, AIDchild, World 
Vision International, and the Horizons Global Research on HIV/AIDS Project of the Population 
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Council.  Finally,47 the House Committee on Energy and Commerce held a hearing in March of 
2003 to focus on the US and international medical response to the epidemic.  The Energy and 
Commerce Committee heard from the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as 
from the Institute for Youth Development, the Russia Programs Partners in Health, the Global 
Health Council, and from a Senior Research Scientist from the Harvard School of Public 
Health.48   
As the House and Senate heard testimony on the HIV/AIDS crisis, the issue grew in 
prominence within the legislature.  Indeed, this swell of information about the U.S. role in the 
HIV/AIDS crisis fueled a range of legislative options. 
B. Early Attempts at HIV/AIDS Legislation in the 107th Congress 
 
 U.S. Leadership, when enacted in the 108th Congress, was particularly “easy legislation” 
because the bill drafters had a wide variety of proposals from the 107th Congress from which to 
draw.  When President Bush issued his executive imperative, Congress had already identified the 
pivotal concerns of each major coalition.  Of course, “[t]he contents of the bill itself are not set in 
granite but evolve over the legislative process [and] the coalition structure supporting the bill and 
the bill's contents evolve simultaneously.” 49  Yet, to a large extent, by the 108th Congress, the 
contentious issues surrounding HIV/AIDS legislation were on the table, such that those 
legislators most intimately involved with negotiating U.S. Leadership went into the negotiations 
prepared to defend their positions, parry, or compromise. 
                                                 
47 The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions held a hearing on HIV/AIDS on March 27, 
2003 and the House Committee on International Relations held a hearing on the five-year U.S. strategy to implement 
U.S. Leadership on April 2, 2003.  As these hearings (and subsequent hearings) corresponded with or occurred after 
the enactment of U.S. Leadership, they do not fall within the purview of this Article.   
48 For a discussion of the ethics of HIV/AIDS researchers participating as advocates in the political process, see, for 
example, SANA LOUE, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF HIV-RELATED RESEARCH 179-83 (1995). 
49 Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives 
on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1438 (2003) (citations omitted).   
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 There were several prominent HIV/AIDS bills introduced in the 107th Congress, in both 
the House and the Senate.  I will first address the prominent House bills and then address the 
prominent Senate bills.  Additionally, since the politically prominent bills were most likely not 
the only bills to influence U.S. Leadership, as there were also several minor bills—in the sense 
that the bill had but a single or few sponsors—in the 107th Congress, I will also address each 
minor bill in turn.   
 In the 107th Congress, the House agreed to “A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 to authorize assistance to prevent, treat, and monitor HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa 
and other developing countries,” a bill sponsored by Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL) with a breadth of 
co-sponsors, including most notably Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Barbara Lee (D-CA), an strong 
proponent of HIV/AIDS legislation.  This House bill emphasized treatment and care through 
indigenous healthcare systems, prevention of mother to child transmission, hospice programs, 
care for orphans, and vaccine research.  The bill would have established oversight procedures for 
pharmaceutical distribution and worked for the development of microfinance institutions.  The 
bill authorized $560 million for treatment in FY 2002 and authorized an additional $50 million 
for the procurement and distribution of pharmaceuticals.  Additionally, the House bill sought to 
establish and Interagency Task Force and a Global Heath Advisory Board to oversee the 
program.  The House bill authorized $750 million in FY 2002 for multilateral efforts to fight 
HIV/AIDS.  While the bill noted that such funding could go to support a global health fund, the 
bill did not expressly authorize any money for the UN Global Fund, which placed the House bill 
in tension with the Senate’s response.  
The Senate soon struck all of the House language after the enacting clause and inserted 
language that combined two Senate bills, one sponsored by Rep. Kennedy (D-MA) and the other 
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by Rep. Kerry (D-MA).50  Both the Kennedy and Kerry bills received bipartisan support, as did 
the Senate bill combining their efforts.  The bill passed the Senate unanimously . . . only to die in 
the House of Representatives when the right-wing Republican leadership refused to send it to the 
floor.   As passed in the upper chamber, the bill required the administration to spend $ 2.5 billion 
on the global fight against the three diseases in fiscal year 2004, of which no less than $ 
1.25 billion was earmarked for the multilateral Global Fund.” 51 
The Kennedy bill,52 which was notably co-sponsored by Sen. Frist (R-TN),53 differed 
from the House bill both in structure and in areas of treatment and prevention concern.  Although 
the Kennedy bill was similar to the House bill in that both bills sought to improve interagency 
coordination, the Kennedy bill outlined its expenditures through the lens of currently established 
agencies—the Center for Disease Control, the Health Resources and Services Administration, 
the National Institutes of Health, and the Department of Labor.  Additionally, the Kennedy bill 
hoped to ensure a safe blood supply, establish links with voluntary counseling programs, 
improve infrastructure and training, fund laboratory assistance and clinical training, establish 
family survival partnerships, further microbicide research, and establish workplace-based 
HIV/AIDS programs.   
                                                 
50 See supra note 21, at 5780 (statement of Sen. Frist) (“The legislation I am introducing today with Senator 
Kennedy and others is a companion to the Foreign Relations bill.  This bill codifies and expands current authorities 
of the Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, to participate in appropriate HIV/AIDS prevention, 
treatment, care, and support activities in resource poor nations that are experiencing an HIV/AIDS crisis.  Coupled 
with S. 2525, the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2002, this 
legislation would provide a better coordinated, enhanced U.S. response to the global pandemic of HIV/AIDS.”). 
51 Jim Lobe, Health-U.S.: Congress Skirmishes Over Bush AIDS Program, INTER-PRESS SERVICE/GLOBAL INFO. 
NETWORK, Feb. 10, 2003. 
52 A bill to provide assistance to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic in developing foreign countries, S. 2649, 107th 
Cong. (2002). 
53 See supra note 21, at 5780 (statement of Sen. Frist) (“In Nairobi, Kenya, I visited the Kibera slum.  With a 
population of over 750,000, one out of five of those who live in Kibera are HIV/AIDS positive.  As I walked the 
crowded pathways sandwiched between hundreds of thousands of aluminum shanties, I was amazed that there were 
only children or elderly individuals.”) 
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The Kerry bill,54 the co-sponsors of which included Sen. Frist (R-TN) and Sen. Leahy 
(D-VT), first suggested establishing a “comprehensive, integrated five-year, global strategy to 
fight HIV/AIDS”—a time line adopted in U.S. Leadership.  The Kerry bill “[reflected] the strong 
overall support for AIDS funding, [as it would have authorized] $4.7 billion to fight HIV/AIDS 
overseas in fiscal 2003 and fiscal 2004.”55  Additionally, the Kerry bill suggests an HIV/AIDS 
Response Coordinator to established in the Department of State—a position which seems quite 
clearly to develop into President Bush’s Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator Ambassador 
position.  While most of the HIV/AIDS bills nodded toward women’s empowerment, the Kerry 
bill is unique in its inclusion of a comprehensive plan to empower women to prevent the spread 
of HIV/AIDS.  The Kerry bill also sought to increase funding for the International AIDS Vaccine 
Initiative; to provide for debt stock reduction for countries eligible under the Enhanced HIPC 
Initiative; and to establish a pilot program placing health care professionals overseas.  Quite 
unusual among HIV/AIDS bills was the Kerry bill’s establishment of a voluntary code of 
conduct for U.S. firms operating abroad, in which those businesses would adopt principles and 
practices to “eliminate decimation and stigmatization against employees on the basis of real or 
perceived HIV/AIDS status.”56  Many bilateral efforts (hospice, vaccine research, etc.) provided 
for in the Kerry bill were provided for in either the House bill or the Kennedy bill; however, in 
keeping with the Kerry bill’s focus on women and girls, the bill calls for bulk purchases of 
preventive technologies for women.  Of particular importance, the Kerry bill authorized $1 
million in FY 2003 and an additional $1.2 million in FY 2004 for the Global Fund.   
                                                 
54 A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to increase assistance for foreign countries seriously affect by 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and for other purposes, S. 2525 107th Cong. (2002). 
55 Miles A. Pomper, Amount of HIV Aid Debated, CQ WKLY, June 22, 2002, at 1680.   
56 Id. 
 13
 Also in the 107th Congress, Rep. Hyde (R-IL) introduced a bill that provided for 
treatment and care—including the development of microfinance institutions—and supported 
funding multilateral aid efforts with up to 25% of the aggregate funds in any fiscal year.57  Rep. 
Pitts (R-PA) introduced a bill to extend HIV/AIDS assistance into Central Asia, giving priority 
to Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.58  Rep. Johnson (D-TX) introduced a bill which 
would have authorized USAID to provide education to foreign law enforcement and military 
personnel to prevent and control HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.59  Rep. Crowley (D-NY), along 
with 52 Democratic co-sponsors, introduced a bill targeting infectious diseases, including 
HIV/AIDS, as such diseases affect women and children.60  Senators Frist (R-TN) and Clinton 
(D-NY) introduced a bill which would have increased international HIV/AIDS funding to federal 
agencies and would have established the Paul Coverdale Health Care Corps to provide medical 
assistance overseas.61  Senators Boxer (D-CA) and Smith (R-OR) introduced a bill authorizing 
additional funding to provide treatment and care for children affected by the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.62  Sen. Durbin (D-IL) introduced a bill structured much like Sen. Kerry’s initiative 
from the 107th Congress, as Sen. Durbin sought to establish an interagency working group and 
                                                 
57 To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize assistance to prevent, treat, and monitor HIV/AIDS in 
sub-Saharan African and other developing countries, H.R. 2069, 107th Cong. (2001).  
58 To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide assistance for the prevention, treatment, and control of 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, polio, and other infectious diseases as such diseases affect children in the 
countries of Central Asia, H.R. 5681, 107th Cong. (2002). 
59 To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize the provision of education and related services to law 
enforcement and military personnel of foreign countries to prevent and control HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, H.R. 
2104, 107th Cong. (2001).   
60 To improve global health by increasing assistance to developing nations with high levels of infectious disease and 
premature death, by improving children’s and women’s health and nutrition, by reducing unintended pregnancies, 
and by combating the spread of infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, and for other purposes, H.R. 1269, 
107th Cong. (2001).  
61 To amend the Public Health Service Act to focus American efforts on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in 
developing countries, S. 1230, 107th Cong. (2001). 
62 To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to increase the authorization of appropriations for fiscal year 2002, 
and to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003, to combat HIV and AIDS, and for other purposes, S. 1120, 
107th Cong. (2001). 
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to distribute HIV/AIDS funding through governmental agencies.63  Sen. Durbin would have 
distributed funds through the CDC, FDA, USAID, NIH, HRSA, the Agency for Health Care 
Research and Quality, and the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce.  
This bill echoed Sen. Frist’s bill by suggesting that Congress establish a Global Physician Corps, 
which would both care for and treat individuals with HIV/AIDS and train host country clinicians.  
In the 108th Congress, Sen. Durbin (D-IL) introduced an updated version of his bill, which was 
then co-sponsored by Sen. Landreiu (D-LA).64  He hoped to authorize $2.1 billion in FY 2004, 
$2.55 billion in FY 2005, and “such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2006 and 
2007” for the Global Health Fund65—up from the $1.2 billion in FY 2003 that the Senator 
proposed in the 107th  Congress66 and substantially more funding than anyone else had 
suggested.   
 Thus, by the time the 108th Congress began to draft U.S. Leadership, each house had a 
solid legislative basis from which to work.  Once the bipartisan interest in HIV/AIDS legislation 
demonstrated in the 107th Congress was coupled with an executive imperative, an “easy 
legislation” experience would ensue.  
IV. PASSING “EASY LEGISLATION”:  A STRUGGLE IN THE IDEOLOGICAL SWAMP AND THEN  
THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 
 
 After President Bush introduced his Emergency Plan in the State of the Union Address, 
both the House67 and the Senate began, once again, to draft HIV/AIDS legislation.68  President 
                                                 
63 To address the international HIV/AIDS pandemic, S. 1936, 107th Cong. (2002).  
64 To address the international HIV/AIDS pandemic, S. 250, 108th Cong. (2003).  
65 Id. 
66 S. 1936. 
67 Cf.  Steger, supra note 19 (“Majority presidents' advantages in controlling the agenda are greater in the House 
than in the Senate. Majority party leaders can manage floor debate and regulate what legislation reaches the floor, 
especially in the House. The Rules Committee and the Speaker, backed by a majority on the floor, can determine 
what amendments will be offered, the order in which amendments will be offered, and the circumstances under 
which motions will be offered. With the ability to regulate what, when, and how amendments are offered, majority 
party leaders can censor legislation they oppose while promoting bills they support.”) (citations omitted). 
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Bush announced that he wanted to have a bill in hand when he went to the G-8 Summit, so that 
he would be able to place pressure on other developed countries to contribute financially to the 
crisis.69  The impending G-8 Summit increased pressure on both the House and the Senate to 
compromise and to some extent race toward completion of a bill.  Ultimately, the House was first 
to complete and pass its bill—sending U.S. Leadership to the Senate.  G-8 pressure led the 
Senate to agree to U.S. Leadership in its House form—although not without grumbling from 
Senators sponsoring their own HIV/AIDS legislation.  Still, had the Senate not been motivated 
by the “easy legislation” factors—bipartisan support for legislation, morality and national 
security concerns, and an executive imperative—the Senate may well have repeated its 107th 
Congress move:  striking the House bill after the enacting clause and inserting the policy balance 
favored in the Senate.70  Since the Senate agreed to the House bill, this Article will focus on U.S. 
Leadership’s journey through the House, highlighting the two primary moments of partisan 
conflict.   
A. Negotiation of Bill Language 
U.S. Leadership “was largely the result of negotiations between the leaders of the House 
International Relations Committee and the White House.” 71  On March 17, 2003, Rep. Henry 
                                                                                                                                                             
68 See ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 286 (“Presidents are sometimes 
called the ‘chief legislators’ because they are closely involved in decisions Congress makes . . . Soon after delivering 
the annual State of the Union address, the president sends to Congress draft ‘administration bills’ for introduction on 
his behalf.”). 
69 See  George W. Bush, Remarks on Departure for Camp David, Maryland, and an Exchange with Reporters, (May 
16, 2003) (“Again, I want to thank the Senate for—as well as the House—for passing a good piece of legislation.  It 
looks like that bill can get done pretty quickly, and I’ll be able to sign it and take it to Europe with me as a symbol of 
the great depth of compassion that our country holds for those that suffer.”).  See also Niels C. Sorrells, House 
Passes Bush Anti-AIDS Plan; Democrats Challenge GOP Changes, CQ Weekly, May 2, 2003, at 1056 (“President 
Bush could not have been any clearer April 29 when he called for Congress to take quick action on his $15 billion 
proposal to combat the international spread of HIV and AIDS.”).   
70 S. 2525. 
71 Niels C. Sorrells, Political Expediency Takes Over as Senate Passes AIDS Relief Bill, CQ WKLY, May 17, 2003, 
at 1210.  Cf. For a discussion of legislative procedures manipulated “to benefit the many at the expense of the few,” 
see LAWRENCE BECKER, DOING THE RIGHT THING: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PROCEDURAL CHOICE IN THE NEW 
 16
Hyde (R-IL) introduced U.S. Leadership in the House of Representatives, and the bill was 
referred to the House International Relations Committee, a committee which Rep. Hyde 
chaired.72  Rep. Hyde was joined by a bipartisan coalition, including:  
Representatives Tom Lantos (Democrat of California), the highest-ranking 
Democrat on the International Relations panel; James Leach (Republican of 
Iowa), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific; Dave Weldon 
(Republican of Florida), a physician who serves on the House Appropriations 
Committee; and Barbara Lee (Democrat of California) who serves on the 
Subcommittee on Africa and chairs the Congressional Black Caucus Task Force 
on Global HIV/AIDS.73 
 
This range of congressional sponsorship emphasizes that U.S. Leadership was born in an “easy 
legislation” culture.  Since the 108th Congress was able to draw upon a range of legislative 
proposals, 74 the bill drafters could focus on structuring a conceptually balanced bill and simply 
improving upon bills of the previous session.75   
Whereas bills introduced in the 107th Congress typically emphasized increasing efficient 
coordination between established divisions of the federal government through interagency 
working groups, U.S. Leadership established a HIV/AIDS Response Coordinator within the State 
                                                                                                                                                             
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 133 (2005) (arguing that “only through closed-door meetings, omnibus legislative vehicles, 
and delegation to unelected officials can the public interest be advanced over the narrow interest.). 
72 H.R. 1298.  For a discussion of bill referral politics, see generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX 
LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 218-21 (2nd ed. 2000) (“Now bills and other 
important measures confront a series of decision points where more complex choices are at issue . . . In the House, 
rules of committee jurisdiction are the most important determinant of the answer, but the Speaker does have some 
discretion . . . In the Senate, committee leaders usually work out problems of conflicting jurisdiction among 
themselves, sometimes by agreeing to multiple referral, more often informally; the majority leader lacks the 
procedural powers the Speaker has and is less likely to take a hand.”). 
73 Stephen La Rocque, Hyde Introduces Bill For $15,000 Million to Fight Diseases, FED. INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, 
Mar. 18, 2003.   
74 Ramesh Ponnuru, Fighting AIDS Right, NAT’L REV., May 19, 2003, at 37 (“In the last Congress, Sens. Bill Frist 
and John Kerry had introduced a global-AIDS bill.  After the President spoke, that bill formed the template for 
legislation. . . .”) 
75 LEE HAMILTON, HOW CONGRESS WORKS AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE 56 (2004) (“Even the earliest stages [of 
bill drafting] involve much maneuvering.  The [sponsoring] member needs to consult with colleagues, experts, and 
interest groups to refine and sharpen the idea [and] study how it differs from and improves upon related proposals 
introduced in the past . . . .”) 
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Department to operate international programs and allocate funds authorized in U.S. Leadership.76  
Otherwise, U.S. Leadership is to a large extent an amalgamation of prior bills, authorizing funds 
to establish prevention programs to provide counseling, prevent mother to child transmission, 
ensure a safe blood supply, finance microfinance programs, improve indigenous health care 
delivery, provide hospice care, provide pharmaceuticals and bulk purchases of condoms.  U.S. 
Leadership also authorizes funds to target children affected by HIV/AIDS, in part by providing 
food and nutrition, to improve infrastructure for HIV/AIDS related programs, to fund vaccine 
research, to combat tuberculosis and malaria, to establish a pilot program to place health care 
professionals overseas, and to improve injection safety.  U.S. Leadership provides some 
additional debt cancellation under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.  While U.S. Leadership is less 
enthusiastic than some prior bills about microbicides, the bill authorized funds when and if 
microbicides were “proven effective.”  Finally, U.S. Leadership contained two apparently new 
provisions, including authorization for a study on the illegal diversion of prescription drugs and a 
remarkable clause authorizing “assistance for the purpose of encouraging men to be responsible 
in their sexual behavior, child rearing, and respect to women.”77 
 When drafting this bill, “[b]oth sides made major concessions with the understanding that 
those dying of AIDS would trump . . . political differences,” said Rep. Lee.78  Primary among 
Democratic concessions was substantial funding for the Global Fund.79  The White House 
                                                 
76 See, e.g., Adam Burton, Note, A Grave and Gathering Threat: Business and Security Implications of the AIDS 
Epidemic and a Critical Evaluation of the Bush Administration’s Response, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 433, 436, 448-54 
(2004) (arguing that the Global Fund is a “more effective vehicle” for fighting AIDS than the U.S. Special 
Coordinator created by U.S. Leadership”).   
77 H.R. 1298.  See also 149 CONG. REC. H3579, 3600 (2003) (statement of Rep. Lantos) (“It is absolutely necessary 
that we deal with both genders if we are to reduce the impact of this disease on women’s life and offer them 
opportunities to live with respect and dignity, free from sexual violence and coercion.”).   
78 149 CONG. REC. H3579, 3611 (2003) (statement of Rep. Lee). 
79 See Sorrells, supra note 62.  See also 149 CONG. REC. H3579, 3598 (statement of Rep. Brown) (“The Global Fund 
is a public-private partnership which draws contributions from governments, from private corporations, from faith-
based organizations and foundations.  The Global Fund has shown signs that it works.  Government entities, in 
 18
strongly favored a unilateral response to the HIV/AIDS crisis—unilateral, in that the U.S. State 
Department would coordinate expenditure of the authorized funds.80  As such “the White House 
[wanted] to reduce or eliminate altogether the $ 1.25-billion earmark for the Global Fund.”81  
Although “Democrats had insisted that the United States needed to contribute $1 billion a year to 
the fund over the course of the bill’s five-year $15 billion authorization,” “[t]hey had to settle for 
an authorization of up to $1 billion with the understanding that the Bush White House is unlikely 
to contribute more than $200 million a year.”82  
The House HIV/AIDS leadership wanted to clinch White House support for their bill, as 
opposed to the Senate bill—support that would ultimately propel U.S. Leadership into law.  
House members continued to compromise, and “after weeks of haggling—and the cancellation 
of several scheduled markups—House members were confident their bill would be the one to 
become law with White House backing.”83  Once the bill language was negotiated with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
coordination with nongoverment [sic] organizations, submit 5-year plans.  The Global Fund recognizes cultural 
differences.  What works in Christian Uruguay may not work the same in Muslim Bangladesh.  No overriding, 
international political agenda is attached to the Global fund’s assistance . . . If we can fully commit to the Global 
Fund, and fully commit means at least $1 billion every year, 2 million patients will be treated for TB, a half million 
AIDS orphans will receive support, and 16 million new malaria nets will be distributed over the next few years.”). 
80 See, e.g., AIDS; Applause For Bush HIV/AIDS Speech; Concern for Global Fund, AFR. NEWS, Feb. 10, 2003 
(“‘We believe that multilateral approaches are effective,’ says the director of the White House Office of National 
Aids Policy, Dr. Joseph O'Neill.  ‘But the Global Fund was never intended to be the sole mechanism by which the 
U.S. government achieves our goal strategically for HIV/Aids care.’”).  See also U.N. Integrated Regional Info. 
Networks, PanAfrica; Aids Activists Call for More US Support to Global Fund, AFR. NEWS, Feb. 12, 2003 (“‘The 
discrepancy over the allocation of money could be attributed to the US desire for more control of multi-lateral 
bodies such as the Fund.’  David Bryden of the Global AIDS Alliance has suggested that ‘[t]he best way they can 
control any funding for HIV/AIDS is to distribute it through US agencies.”’). 
81 Jim Lobe, Health-U.S.: Congress Skirmishes Over Bush AIDS Program, INTER-PRESS SERVICE/GLOBAL INFO. 
NETWORK, Feb. 10, 2003.  See, e.g., Alan Ingram, Global Leadership and Global Health: Contending Meta-
narratives, Divergent Responses, Fatal Consequences, 19 INT'L REL. 381, 390-92 (2005) (discussing the "unilateral 
orientation" of the Bush administration regarding global health initiatives). 
82 Sorrells, supra note 62.  
83 Id.  See also SINCLAIR, supra note 52, at 223 (“In the House, a bill can benefit from “special procedures and 
practices,” including “multiple referral, omnibus, the result of a summit, committee bypassed, postcommittee 
adjustments, and consideration under a complex or closed rule.  The Senate measure is identical except that it does 
not include consideration under a complex or closed rule . . . The likelihood that a bill will become law increases 
with the number of special procedures and practices employed in the House.  Again the relationship is similar for the 
Senate.”). 
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White House, 84 U.S. Leadership would navigate the two crucial moments in “easy legislation”—
first, the hot topic sacrifice, and then amendment on the floor. 
B. Hot Topic Sacrifice 
 U.S. Leadership demonstrates that passing bipartisan legislation can be facilitated by the 
sacrifice of a hot-button topic—here, the “Mexico City Policy.”  Under the “Mexico City 
Policy,” commonly known as the “global gag rule,” U.S. funding for family planning services is 
conditioned on NGOs ceasing “to perform and ‘actively promote’ abortion-related services.”85 
“Initially, [social conservatives] major worry about [the President’s Emergency Plan] was that it 
would give government funds to groups that perform or promote abortion.”86  As indicated by an 
unclassified briefing memorandum from February 11, 2003 to Secretary of State Colin Powell, 
the White House hoped to expand the coverage of the “Mexico City Policy” to include “funds 
expended for HIV/AIDS assistance . . . as well as, presumably, other components of reproductive 
health assistance . . . .”87  This memo stated that “Hill conservatives will not support a policy that 
provides carve out for HIV/AIDS projects performed by foreign NGOs who also perform 
abortions or support abortion policies.  Moderate and liberal members of both sides of the aisle 
will support such a carve out.”88  Additionally, the memo predicted that expansion of the 
“Mexico City Policy” would “generate great controversy and likely cause a major delay in 
                                                 
84 See LEE H. HAMILTON, HOW CONGRESS WORKS AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE 58 (“The fate of a legislative 
proposal is also influenced by the preferences of the president and the executive branch bureaucracy.  A member of 
Congress trying to advance a bill must take constant readings from the White House to learn if the president will 
veto it or sign it in its current form.”) 
85 Allegra A. Jones, Note, The “Mexico City Policy” and Its Effects on HIV/AIDS Services in Subsaharan Africa,” 
24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 187, 188-9 (2004).   
86 Ramesh Ponnuru, Fighting AIDS Right, NAT’L REV., May 19, 2003, at 36. 
87 See Memorandum from Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and 
Migration, to Colin Powell, Secretary of State (Feb. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Dewey Memo], available at 
http://www.planetwire.org/wrap/files.fcgi/3844_StateDeptMemo.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).  Statements by 
Secretary Powell at a subsequent congressional hearing intimated that the White House was considering expanding 
the Mexico City Policy. See generally Hon. Colin Powell, S. Budget Comm., 108th Cong., Statement on President’s 
International Affairs Budget (Comm. Print 2003).  
88 Id.  
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consideration of the FY 2004 Foreign Operations Bill.”89  While this memo does not speak 
specifically to the U.S. Leadership bill, if the White House wished in February 2003 to expand 
the “Mexico City Policy” into the realm of HIV/AIDS funding, U.S. Leadership would have 
been a natural vehicle for such an expansion.   
Indeed, U.S. Leadership became “caught in the long-standing fight over the gag-rule.”90  
While conservatives and religious groups pressed for inclusion of the “Mexico City Policy” in 
the bill, public health advocates strongly denounced its expansion.91  In February, the White 
House offered a “compromise,” suggesting that organizations performing abortions would be 
eligible for funding as long as they kept their funded, non-abortion programs separate and 
accounted for all of the money.92  AIDS advocates responded that such bookkeeping would be 
“impractical in Third World countries and would discriminate against pregnant women with 
AIDS.”93  Kirsten Sherk, the spokeswoman for Planned Parenthood’s international programs, 
argued that this compromise would be unworkable not only because women would be unlikely to 
visit multiple clinics for their healthcare needs, but also because “cash-strapped” NGOs would be 
unable to finance separate facilities.94  The Center for Health and Gender Equity was one of 
many groups that wrote to President Bush to urge him not to expand the policy.  As stated by 
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their Executive Director, Jodi Jacobson:  “We're talking about places where it's not like, you 
know, the money is available to set up a clinic here and a clinic there. We're talking about places 
where access to health care itself is an urgent situation.”95  The tumult increased as anti-abortion 
advocates were pitted against AIDS advocates,96 and the “global gag-rule” threatened to turn 
global AIDS legislation into a massive stalemate.   
Ultimately, however, the “Mexico City Policy” was not expanded into U.S. Leadership.97  
The Bush administration stipulated “that the AIDS funds would not be used for abortions.  That 
was enough to get the leading pro-life group, the National Right to Life Committee, to hold its 
fire.”98  Rep. Lantos and Rep. Hyde were determined to usher the House bill through on a 
bipartisan basis.  Rep. Lantos stated, "In negotiating this with the White House, I felt it was 
extremely important not to become bogged down in gag rule politics. . . . So far, I've been 
successful in getting that rational position to prevail."99  However, a Democrat’s desire to avoid 
“gag rule politics”—and thus avoid expansion of the “gag-rule”—was really no surprise.  It 
seems clear that Rep. Henry Hyde, himself an “adamant opponent of abortion,”100 was well 
aware that any Mexico City provision “would scuttle the legislation [and] warned lawmakers on 
both sides of the aisle not to pursue controversial amendments . . . .”101     
C. Ideological Amendment Inundation 
The “easy legislation” process comes up against a crucial hurdle with the introduction of 
floor amendments.  “In Congress . . . floor amendments are a very important part of the process 
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and are often adopted.”102  U.S. Leadership survived intact through committee, even though 
conservatives “attempted to give abstinence and monogamy education programs priority over 
condom distribution plans. . . .”103  Since the Democrats enjoyed a small majority within the 
House International Relations Committee, they were able to defeat several such conservative 
suggestions for altering the bill.104  However, when U.S. Leadership was enacted, the Republican 
Party enjoyed the majority in the House, and Democrats were wary of a reemergence of 
conservative proposals on the floor. 105   When those conservative amendments were introduced 
for floor consideration, “Democrats said they were surprised to see they had been significantly 
toned down.”106  Indeed, “despite their consternation at the amendments inserted into the bill, 
Democrats conceded that it could have been much worse.”107  In an “easy legislation” culture, 
floor amendments reflect the spirit of the hot button sacrifice:  even if the majority party would 
like to flood a bill with ideological amendments, both parties continue with a spirit of acceptance 
and compromise.108   
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The Tauzin-Brown amendment, which primarily worked to prioritize U.S. programs to 
countries based on the size and demographics of their HIV/AIDS population, is a particularly apt 
example of floor amendment responsive to an “easy legislation” culture.  The amendment 
required that the HIV/AIDS coordinator make available to Congress “all financial and 
accounting statements for the Global Fund” and placed limitations on administrative 
expenditures of the Global Fund.  Rep. Tauzin stated that, “the amendment requires that the 
HIV/AIDS coordinator make available to Congress basic information on the Global Fund . . . In 
the past we have had great difficulty getting this information from the Global Fund.  We are 
confident that the coordinator will do a wonderful job in delivering this information to 
Congress.”109  Rep. Lantos, however, had reservations about limitations on administrative 
expenditures for the Global Fund:  “when the fund may be going through a massive expansion of 
operations, there may be a need for some significant investments to make sure that the Global 
Fund can properly administer its programs.”  Still, Mr. Lantos was “prepared to accept the 
amendment [and looked] forward to working with the sponsors to clarify and further refine [the] 
provisions.”110  When considered alongside Rep. Biggert’s (R-IL) amendment, which encourages 
the President to “conduct an outreach campaign that is designed to inform the public of the 
existence of the Global Fund [and] encourage private contributions to the Global Fund,”111  the 
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Tauzin-Brown/Biggert response to the highly contentious Global Fund emphasizes U.S. 
Leadership’s “easy legislation” culture of compromise. 
 Yet, as previously noted, floor amendments provide a solid opportunity for the majority 
party to insert ideological bias into an “easy legislation” bill.  Much news coverage of U.S. 
Leadership has focused on its apparent promotion of abstinence.112  In the draft bill, Congress 
adopted the ABC model to prevention—abstain, be faithful, use condoms.  Then, by agreeing to 
an amendment offered by Congressman Pitts (R-PA), Congress altered U.S. Leadership to 
require that at least 33% of prevention funding should be expended for abstinence-until-marriage 
programs.   
In the debate, Rep. Pelosi (D-CA) argued: “H.R. 1298 is a bipartisan bill that we can all 
proudly support . . . Why sacrifice that broad support in the name of politics, especially when so 
many lives are at stake?  Keeping information from people does not keep them safe.  And when 
that information is about AIDS, it can be a death sentence.”113  Rep. Lee (D-CA) added: 
“[A]gain, we see attempts to unravel the delicate compromise established by our negotiations on 
this bill.  We have already dealt with this issue in another forum in the Committee on 
International Relations when the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts) pushed for the 
prioritization of abstinence over condom use in the ABC model of prevention.  Abstinence, 
fidelity, and the use of condoms should all be placed on equal footing; and that is what we 
agreed to in committee.”114   Rep. Cummings (D-MD) also spoke in opposition to the 
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amendment:  “We do not have time to play Russian Roulette with millions of lives while testing 
politically charged prevention methods.  In fact, a 2001 report issued by the National Institute of 
Health concluded that beyond mutual lifelong monogamy among uninfected couples, condom 
use is the only method for reducing the risk of HIV infection and STDs available to sexually 
active individuals.”115   
However, Rep. Pence (R-IN) argued in support of the amendment that, “in a statement of 
administration policy, Mr. Chairman, the administration said they, quote ‘support additional 
provisions that would prioritize the abstinence component of the ABC approach which as been 
successfully implemented in Uganda.”116  As the majority was with Reps. Pitts and Pence, the 
amendment passed and has become a focal point for arguments that PEPFAR, motivated by a 
moral agenda,117 prioritizes abstinence over condom use and “will cause significant numbers of 
infections than would have been avoided.”118     
In addition to this “abstinence amendment,” Rep. Smith (R-NJ) offered what has become 
known as the “faith based” amendment.  Rep. Smith’s amendment provides that an “organization 
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that is otherwise eligible to receive assistance . . . to prevent, treat, or monitor HIV/AIDS shall 
not be required, as a condition of receiving the assistance,  to endorse, utilize, or participate in a 
prevention method or treatment program to which the organization has a religious or moral 
objection.”119  Rep. Smith argued that “if a Muslim or Catholic organization is excellent in 
abstinence education or AIDS testing, they should not be disqualified from U.S. funding because 
they have a moral objection to condoms.”120  In support of the amendment, Rep. Renzi (R-AZ) 
stated, “While it has been said they undermine, the fact is, again, reiterating, these faith-based 
organizations, particularly the Catholic-based organizations, care for one out of every four AIDS 
sufferers in the world.”121   
Rep. Lee, opposed the amendment, stating:  
[I]t seems to me, quite frankly, that social conservatives are looking at a way to 
carve out a specific exemption.  All of us support faith-based organizations, but it 
looks like one group of individuals in this country wants to carve out for religious 
organizations a specific exemption.  The amendment looks tame on its face, but I 
really think there is another motive behind this amendment.   I do not believe that 
we should subject this very important piece of legislation to the ideological whims 
of either side.  The compromise that we negotiated in the bill was specifically 
intended to avoid this . . . It appears now that this amendment would give an 
organization the ability to affirmatively tell those suffering and dying of AIDS not 
to use one method over another.  This could be deadly.122 
 
However, although Rep. Lee worried that the Smith amendment upset the ideological balance of 
the bill, as with the “abstinence amendment,” the language offered on the floor was significantly 
toned down from the language offered in committee.123  Thus, although U.S. Leadership went to 
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the Senate with a decided ideological bent, that ideology has been tempered by “easy legislation” 
compromise. 
D. The Senate Acquiesces 
The Senate passed U.S. Leadership without amendment.  Although some Senators 
complained about the inadequacy of the House bill when compared to the Senate’s 107th 
Congress proposal, 124  their complaints amounted to political posturing, as the Senate was 
committed to enacting an HIV/AIDS bill this time.125  Sen. Lugar (R-IN), who chaired the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,  “had to decide between holding out for his version of the 
bill—and causing a potentially time-consuming conference that would disappoint his 
president126—and making quick work of the House bill.  In the end, he chose the latter, more 
politically attractive option.” 127  Sen. Lugar was joined by Sen. Frist128 in urging their colleagues 
to “forgo their vision of the bill and embrace political expediency.”129  Indeed, Sen. Frist has 
been quoted arguing, “We can’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.”130  In doing so, he 
sums up U.S. Leadership’s legislative journey:  in this “easy legislation,” the executive, both 
parties, and both houses choose to compromise. 
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 In this Article, I have explored the concept of “easy legislation.”  I have traced the 
drafting of a bill with strong bipartisan support coupled with an executive imperative from its 
roots in an information uprising and unenacted bill language.  I have argued that, once a topic is 
grounded in bipartisan support and an executive imperative, an individual legislator has little 
choice but to compromise.  Even when congressmen in the majority party insert their ideology 
into the bill through floor amendments, their amendments are tempered.  Moreover, the 
executive and majority party are willing to compromise in order to propel “easy legislation” 
through both Houses—even if that compromise requires that they sacrifice the opportunity to 
piggyback contentious legislation onto the bill.  Thus, U.S. Leadership has facilitated a 
fascinating case study of a previously unconsidered area of legislation: legislative topics with 
near unanimous support and their corresponding bills that compel compromise. 
 
